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I. INTRODUCTION  
The role of industrial clusters in the economic development of countries and regions has drawn 
the attention of both academics and policymakers. The idea of promoting the formation and 
development of clusters is based on the assumption that firm-level performance benefits from 
agglomeration. These so-called agglomeration economies were first introduced by Marshall 
(1920) and later rediscovered by Arrow and Romer. Agglomeration economies originate from a 
set of positive externalities that are simultaneously industry specific and location specific. These 
externalities are mainly due to knowledge or technology spillovers, input/output sharing and 




Porter (1998, 2000) has recently influenced the discussion of the relevance of industrial clusters 
arguing that while changes in technology and competition have diminished the relevance of 
location decisions, clusters are a striking feature of today’s economies.
2
 Indeed, as Krugman 
(1991) and, Ellison and Glaeser (1997) note, industries tend to be geographically concentrated. 
In this context, the main reason for interest towards industrial agglomeration, as originally 
pointed out by Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), is that firms may benefit from the proximity to each 
other due to the existence of the aforementioned externalities.  
Several studies provide evidence in this direction. The empirical literature on agglomeration 
economies began in the 1970’s with the contributions of Shefer (1973) and Sveikauskas (1975). 
However, the work by Ciccone and Hall (1996) was the first to clearly address endogeneity 
issues – i.e. reverse causality: firms benefit from agglomeration because of externalities and, at 
the same time, the best firms decide to locate close to other firms. Using data on gross state 
output in the United States, they find that a doubling of employment density increases average 
labor productivity by around 6 percent. Other papers presenting evidence of agglomeration 
economies include Ellison and Glaeser (1999), Hanson (2001), Dumais et al. (2002), Rosenthal 
and Strange (2003), Rodríguez-Clare (2005, 2007), Combes et al. (2008, 2010), Ellison et al. 
(2010) and Rizov et al. (2012). 
This evidence on the benefits of agglomeration notwithstanding, it is also a well-known result in 
economic theory that in the presence of externalities the market often fails to assign resources 
optimally. This is particularly relevant when geographical proximity and industry 
complementarities cause agglomeration economies. In this context, cluster policies may foster 
the beneficial effects of agglomeration by creating a set of incentives to overcome the 
coordination failures that hamper the development of certain industries. A first stage of this type 
                                                          
1
 In more generic terms, the literature has also referred to the concept of industry-specific local externalities (ISLE). 
Henderson et al. (1995) refer to these types of industry-specific externalities that arise from regional agglomeration 
as “localization externalities”, in particular when firms operate in related sectors and are closely located. 
2
 The simplest definition of an industry cluster is derived from the work of Porter (1990), who defines clusters as “a 




of interventions is usually a process whereby linkages between the different cluster stakeholders 
(firms, support institutions, and public agencies) and externalities are built up through support to 
latent and potential clusters. This step includes the preparation and adoption of cluster 
development plans to map and facilitate cluster formation and encourage the interaction among 
private agents (private-private and public-private). In a second stage, consolidated clusters are 
usually supported by public investments to promote innovation and joint learning, and overcome 
technological, infrastructure and environmental constraints – e.g. investments in knowledge 
creation and technology adoption which are two of the major sources of industry and location 
specific externalities as well as joint-investments in public goods. 
Several countries have implemented cluster-development programs. Unfortunately, few 
evaluations have been carried out to assess the impact of this type of public policies and, the 
evidence remains scarce and inconclusive.
3
 Falck et al. (2009) evaluate a cluster program 
introduced in 1999 in Bavaria, Germany, aimed at fostering innovation and regional 
competitiveness by stimulating cooperation. They find that the cluster-oriented policy increased 
the likelihood of becoming an innovator in the targeted industry. Nishimura and Okamuro (2011) 
evaluate the Industrial Cluster Project (ICP)
4
 in Japan. Their results suggest that beneficiaries 
expand the industry-university-government network. Interestingly, they find that while clusters 
participants that collaborate with national universities in the same region significantly improve 
the R&D productivity – without reducing patent quality – participation in the cluster project 
alone has no significant effect on the R&D productivity of firms. Finally, Martin et al. (2011a) 
analyze a public policy promoting industrial clusters in France for the period 1996-2004, and 
apply a difference-in-differences approach. They find that the program selected firms in relative 
decline and find no major effect on productivity. They also conclude the policy had no robust 
effects on employment and exports. 
To our knowledge, there are no impact evaluations of cluster policies in Latin America. 
Although similar types of programs, such as agricultural (Cerdán-Infantes et al. 2008; López and 
Maffioli, 2008; González et al., 2009), innovation (Binelli and Maffioli, 2007; Hall and Maffioli, 
2008; Crespi et al., 2011; Benavente et al., 2012), export promotion (Volpe and Carballo, 2008), 
SME support (Castillo et al., 2010; López Acevedo and Tan, 2010) and supplier development 
(Arráiz et al., 2011) have been analyzed,
5
 none of these directly evaluate a cluster policy. The 
study by Maffioli (2005) is probably the closest piece of research to an impact evaluation of a 
                                                          
3
 As Anderson et al. (2004) point out, thorough evaluations of specific cluster initiatives and cluster actions are in 
fact few and have been developed only in few countries. Few solid attempts have been made to assess whether first-
best results are obtained, go beyond efficiency in use of given resources to encompass economic results, or take into 
account interactions and synergies in the performance of different actors. Further, most evaluations of cluster 
policies pursued still focus on single tools, which fits poorly with the systemic notion of cluster policy. 
4
 The ICP was initiated by the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry in 2001 and aims at developing 
regional industries and includes both direct R&D support and indirect networking/coordination support. 
5
 Several of these evaluations were done by the Inter-American Development Bank. 
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cluster policy in this region. He presents a theoretical discussion of industrial networks and 
empirically analyzes the most important Chilean networking program, the PROFO program.
6
  
In this paper, we aim at closing this knowledge gap and shedding light on the effectiveness of 
cluster policies by focusing on the case of Brazil’s Arranjos Produtivos Locais (APL), a cluster 
development policy in place since 2004. More precisely, we analyze the impact of participating 
in APLs on a series of performance indicators for SMEs, including level of employment, value 
of exports and likelihood of exporting.
7
 
We present evidence of a positive direct average effect of the APL program on the three 
outcomes of interest – level of employment, value of exports and the likelihood of exporting – 
we considered. Furthermore, those positive effects seem to be increasing over time. We also find 
evidence of positive spillovers on both export outcomes. These effects seem to become more 
pronounced in the medium and long term. Results reinforce the idea that finding direct and 
indirect effects of a cluster policy on firms’ performance requires considering the fact that the 
realization of such impacts may require a period of gestation after the policy is implemented. 
Our contributions to the empirical literature are twofold. First, we add to the general impact 
evaluation literature not only by studying the direct impact of a large cluster program, but also by 
testing for potential indirect (i.e. spillover) effects, and carefully considering the timing of the 
realization of impacts. Second, we provide what to our knowledge is the first evaluation of a 
specific cluster policy in Latin America, expanding the current literature which to this point has 
almost exclusively focused on developed countries. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the APL program. Section III 
describes the relationships of interest, the ideal experiment, the estimation methods and the 
robustness checks used to assess the impact of the cluster policy. Section IV presents and 
summarizes the data used for the estimations and performs a preliminary analysis. Section V 




                                                          
6
 The availability of relational data on a significant number of firm networks allows him to investigate in detail the 
relationship between network structure, public intervention and firm competitiveness. His econometric analysis 
confirms a strong correlation between PROFO firms’ innovativeness and industrial cooperation, proving the 
existence of an interactive learning process among participant firms. Using sociometric data to refine the analysis of 
the impact of the program on the network multiplier he finds that participant firms increase their productivity and 
that this improvement is strongly correlated with firm centrality and network density, which are the two variables 
best representing the structure and function of the network multiplier and that are affected by PROFO. 
7
 Given the confidentiality of the data, the estimations were conducted following the Instituto de Pesquisa 
Econômica Aplicada’s microdata policy, which implies working in situ under the supervision of its staff and with 
blinded access to sensible information. 
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II. BRAZIL’S ARRANJOS PRODUTIVOS LOCAIS 
In Brazil, during the last decade, the public and private organizations that promote small and 
medium-sized firms (SMEs)
8
 have increasingly focused on the development of local productive 
clusters, known as Arranjos Produtivos Locais or APLs.  According to the definition given by 
the Brazilian Service to Support Micro and Small Enterprises (SEBRAE), APLs – "local 
productive arrangements" or "local systems" –  are clusters of firms within the same 
administrative area (e.g. municipality) that share a particular specialization. Firms within each 
cluster maintain ties of cooperation and learning both among themselves and with other 
stakeholders such as government, business associations, lenders, and teaching and research 
institutions. An APL is characterized by the existence of a group of firms operating in the same 
economic activity. For instance, manufacturing firms producing goods and services, suppliers of 




The importance of APLs in Brazil’s industrial policy is illustrated by the fact that cluster support 
is recognized as one of the key pillars of Brazil’s Industrial, Technological, and Foreign Trade 
Policy (PITCE), and of the Brazilian Industrial Development Agency (ABDI).
10
 In the last 
decade most of the states who started implementing policies to develop and support clusters have 
been mainly guided by the federal government through the APL Permanent Working Group 
(GTP-APL) created in 2004 in the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade 
(MDIC). This agency promotes coordination among the various federal and state agencies 
working with APLs.  
The purpose of this integrated APL policy has been to stimulate local development through 
competitiveness and sustainability projects in territories where has been some kind of pre-
existing agglomeration of SMEs. More specifically, the selection criteria for APLs in the states 
where we focus our evaluation (Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais) can be summarized in the 
following four points: (i) capability and possibilities of operating and collaborating with other 
organizations; (ii) form and degree of development of the APL – selection is guided by the 
number and maturity of participating institutions, the existence of a local governmental 
institution capable of coordinating collective actions, and the quality of linkages between firms 
                                                          
8
 The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) defines microenterprises and small businesses as firms 
employing up to 49 workers in the services sector and up to 99 in the industrial sector. For the National Bank for 
Economic and Social Development (BNDES) a microenterprise is a firm with sales of less than R$1.2 million, while 
a “small” firm has sales of between R$1.2 million and R$10.5 million, and a “medium-sized” one between R$10.5 
million and R$60 million. 
9
 See Lastres et al. (2002, 2003). 
10
 This agency’s main objectives are to coordinate and synchronize efforts made by various government institutions 
and levels to achieve consistency in productive-sector support policies, and to improve the country’s technological 
base in areas displaying the greatest growth potential, including: (i) strengthening the industrial structure of 
industrial property; (ii) promoting innovative SME capacity; (iii) creating a favorable investment environment; and 




and other actors; (iii) socio-economic relevance of the main activity of the APL e.g. impact on 
GDP, exports and level of employment, and (iv) capability of generating new opportunities for 
social and economic development and innovation.
11
 
Policy actions were designed following a set of guidelines that seek to maximize the impact on 
local development, increase social capital, and integrate participating agents.
12
 Under this 
framework, participating ministries as well as governmental and non-governmental agencies 
designed and implemented several instruments to support APL development. More precisely, 
policy actions consist of two main components. First, private and public agents jointly elaborate 
strategic development plans. In this stage the main role of public agents is to facilitate interaction 
between the various agents involved and designate local leaders to be responsible for 
coordinating each plan’s execution. The focus is on the development of methodologies for the 
organization and consolidation of the APLs. Secondly, – once each plan is completed – public 
agents support recently consolidated APLs through different instruments aimed at increasing 
competitiveness of the productive chains. This stage includes direct investment in infrastructure, 
equipment, specific training and technology transfer programs, implementation of sectorial 
technology centers, design offices, export promotion programs, and information systems for 
monitoring and evaluation.  
The overall goals of this integrated policy are: (i) to promote economic development; (ii) to 
reduce social and regional inequalities; (iii) to foster technological innovation; (iv) to expand and 
modernize the productive base; (v) to foster employment and income; (vi) to reduce the failure 
rate of SMEs; (vii) to improve education and training; and (viii) to increase productivity, 
competitiveness and exports. This paper will be mainly focusing on the effectiveness of such 
policy in accomplishing goals (v) and (viii). The remaining goals, although key for policy 
formulation, will be addressed in future research. Moreover, due to problem of data availability 
we are not able to identify each instrument separately. Then, we evaluate the APL policy as a 
unique program compounding the different instruments just described. 
 
III. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF A CLUSTER POLICY 
(a) The Causal Relationships of Interest 
To measure the impact of a cluster policy we need to identify a causal effect. The causal effect of 
a policy is the difference between the value of the outcome variable after the policy took place 
and the value that the outcome variable would have been in absence of the policy. Suppose the 
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 This selection criteria is defined in Politicas Estaduais para Arranjos Productivos Locais no Sul, Sudeste e 
Centro-Oeste do Brasil, 2010 (www.bndes.gov.br). 
12
 This is how the objectives are defined in the Termo de Referencia para Politica Nacional de Apoio ao 
Desenvolvimiento de Arranjos Productivos Locais (2004). 
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cluster policy variable takes the value one when firm i belongs to APL and zero otherwise – i.e. 
Ci = {0,1}. Suppose in addition that if firm i participates in APL – i.e. Ci=1 – its value of the 
outcome variable is Yi1 and if it does not participate – i.e. Ci=0 – its value of the outcome 
variable is Yi0. In this setting, Yi1 and Yi0 are our potential outcomes.  
Then, the observed outcome variable of firm i can be written as: 













or equivalently,  
       Yi = Yi0 + (Yi1-Yi0).Ci.      
The difference between the potential outcomes Yi1 – Yi0 is the causal effect of the cluster policy C 
on the outcome variable Y for firm i. The main problem in measuring this effect arises because 
the counterfactual outcome (Yi0 for treated firms, Yi1 for untreated firms) is never observed, and 
therefore we must estimate it.
13
 Furthermore, because it is not possible to estimate the effect of C 
on Y for each individual I – except under very stringent and unrealistic assumptions – we often 
focus on estimating average treatment effects. For this, we need to identify a valid control group, 
in our case, a group of firms with the same characteristics than the group of beneficiaries of the 




Before discussing how to ideally construct both the treated (beneficiaries) and control (non-
beneficiaries) groups we also need to consider another key challenge in the evaluation of cluster 
policies: how to deal with externalities and spillovers. The first step in addressing this issue is to 
note that there are two types of beneficiaries (direct and indirect) and therefore two causal 
relationships of interest.  
Direct beneficiaries are firms in a cluster that participate in the cluster policy program – i.e. they 
choose to actively participate in the cluster development plan. Indirect beneficiaries are those 
firms that do not participate in the program but have linkages with participants. For instance, 
firms that share the geographical location with participating firms may indirectly benefit from 
higher foreign direct investment in the region attracted by cluster firms (De Propris and Driffield, 
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 This is the Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference (see Holland, 1986). 
14
 Basically, if assignment to treatment is randomized, the inference problem is straightforward because the 
treatment and control groups are from the same population. We can then estimate the Average Treatment Effect 
(ATE). With observational data the two groups are not drawn from the same population. In this case, we often want 





 We will base our definition of indirect beneficiaries on this geographical criterion; i.e., 
we assume that geographical proximity is the channel through which spillovers occur. Thus, an 
indirect beneficiary is a firm that does not participate in the plan but is located in a municipality 
where the APL policy was implemented. We will refer to the municipalities with a positive 
number of APL firms as “treated municipalities”. Finally, non-beneficiaries are firms located in 
municipalities not treated by the program. However, some non-beneficiaries may be contiguous 
with a treated municipality and therefore benefit from spillovers. If this is the case then our 
estimates would be a lower bound of the impact of the program since these firms are also 
included in our control group. 
(b) The Ideal Experiment 
Like in other type of policies, the ideal experiment that would answer the causal effect questions 
is a randomized assignment of the cluster policy.
16
 However, in this case, the randomization has 
to be done at two different levels – i.e. double randomization.
17
 The need for this double 
randomization responds to the fact that both the locations where the policy will be implemented 
and the firms that will participate directly have to be selected. Then, we have three groups: 
1. Direct Beneficiaries: APL firms 
2. Indirect Beneficiaries: non-APL firms in a treated municipality 
3. Non-beneficiaries (control or comparison group): non-APL firms in a non-treated municipality 
Once the policy has been randomly assigned and in order to identify its effect, we are able to do 
two set of comparisons. The first comparison is between direct beneficiaries (APL firms) and 
similar non-beneficiaries. This comparison would provide the direct impact of the policy: 
DATE = E[Yi|Di=1,Ci=1] – E[Yi|Di=0,Ci=0] 
where Di takes value 1 if the municipality is a treated municipality and 0 otherwise and DATE is 
the Direct Average Treatment Effect i.e. it is the difference between the average value of the 
outcome variable for direct beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. 
The second comparison involves comparing indirect beneficiaries with similar non-beneficiaries. 
This comparison identifies the Indirect Average Treatment Effect i.e. spillover effects: 
                                                          
15
 Bronzini and Piselli (2009) consider geographical spillovers assuming that factors enhancing productivity in one 
region can also affect the productivity in the neighboring regions. Bottazzi and Peri (2003) use geographical 
proximity as a channel for R&D spillovers. 
16
 With a large enough number of observations, the randomized assignment of the policy ensures that beneficiaries 
and non-beneficiaries have statistically equivalent averages not only for their observed characteristics but also for 
their unobserved characteristics before the policy is applied. 
17
 See Angelucci and Di Maro (2010). 
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IATE = E[Yi|Di=1,Ci=0] – E[Yi|Di=0,Ci=0] 
In principle, we would like to randomly assign the treated municipalities and the cluster policy as 
described above (double randomization). However, in most cases cluster policies are not 
designed using randomized assignment. Hence, in the absence of a randomized control trial we 
use quasi-experimental methods that mimic an experiment under certain assumptions and 
therefore, we will focus on estimating the average effect of the treatment on the treated firms 
(ATT). 
(c) Identification Strategy and Estimation Methods 
The main idea to identify the impact of a cluster policy without random assignment of the policy 
is the same as in the case of random assignment – i.e. to compare direct and indirect beneficiaries 
with non-beneficiaries. However, in absence of a randomization, beneficiaries may be different 
from non-beneficiaries because of selection bias. In the case of cluster policies, as in other 
productive development policies, it is likely that beneficiaries are more or less productive than 
non-beneficiaries. Therefore, beneficiaries may show different outcomes than non-beneficiaries 
even in absence of the cluster policy. In terms of the notation described earlier, it is possible to 
expect both a positive – i.e.  E[Yi0|Di=1,Ci=1] or even E[Yi0|Di=1,Ci=0]  larger than E[Yi0|Di=0, 
Ci=0] or negative – e.g. if the policy selected firms in sectors and regions in relative decline – 
selection bias. Then, the comparison of the average of the outcome variable between 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries will over or underestimate the effect of the policy. 
As suggested before, the selection problem occurs because beneficiaries (direct and indirect) are 
different than non-beneficiaries even before the policy is implemented. Several techniques can 
be used to avoid these potential problems. First, if participation is determined by observable 
factors, these variables can be included as control variables in a regression framework. However, 
some of these relevant factors may be unobservable – e.g. entrepreneurial behavior of the firm, 
manager characteristics and leadership – and thus cannot be accounted for. Nevertheless, the 
panel structure of our database allows us to eliminate all confounding factors (both observable 
and unobservable), as long as they do not vary over time, using a fixed-effects model. Under this 
assumption we can identify the effect of the cluster policy on our outcomes of interest using the 




                                          (1) 
where      is any of the outcomes under study of the firm i in year t,    captures all time-constant 
factors that are firm-specific,    represents yearly shocks that affect all firms,   is the parameter 
of interest which captures the causal effect of       (a binary variable that takes the value one 
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 See Bertrand et al. (2004) for a discussion on Differences-in-Differences estimates. 
10 
 
since the year in which the firm i enters the APL)
19
 on the outcome under consideration,      is a 
vector of time-varying control variables, and      is an error term which may be correlated within 
each cluster but is assumed to be independently and identically distributed across clusters. In the 
absence of time-varying unobserved factors that affect both the outcome and the participation in 
APL, the fixed-effects method leads to a consistent estimator for  , the average impact of the 
cluster policy on the treated firms. 
The validity of the fixed-effects estimator rests on the identification assumption that trends in the 
outcomes would have been equal in absence of treatment. However, this non-testable assumption 
may be difficult to accept when firms in the control group are very heterogeneous and very 
different from the participating firms, since firms that are very different at the baseline are likely 
to follow different trends as well.  
In order to reinforce the validity of our identification assumption, we run equation (1) on a 
matched sample, selecting among firms in the comparison group those that are more similar to 
beneficiaries not only in terms of observed characteristics but also on their pre-treatment 
performance. We use Nearest Neighbor Matching with one neighbor and replacement applying it 
to the year before the beginning of the cluster policy i.e. 2003. For each type of beneficiary we 
match on each outcome separately using its values for the period 2002-2003 and observed 
characteristics of the firm in 2003 i.e. region, industry, size, age and a Herfindahl index.
20
 We do 
this to ensure that we select from the control group only those which have pre-treatment trends 
that are similar to direct and indirect beneficiaries.
21
 
 As mentioned above, the equality in the growth rate of the outcome variables in absence of the 
program is a non-testable assumption and the combination of these methods can make it more 
credible. It involves three steps: (i) estimating the propensity score before the treatment takes 
place, (ii) defining a matched sample of firms – we are left with the treated firms and their 
nearest neighbors –, and (iii) running a fixed effects model on this matched sample. Heinrich et 
al. (2010) provide guidelines for the application of this method. For a recent application of this 
procedure to evaluate a SME policy in Argentina see Castillo et al. (2010).  
We reinforce our estimates by using entropy balancing, a multivariate reweighting method 
proposed by Hainmueller (2012). This method allows us to reweight our full sample such that the 
control group matches the covariate moments in the treatment group.
22
 In this paper, we focus on 
                                                          
19
 In the case of indirect beneficiaries Ci,t takes the value one since the year in which the municipality is a treated 
municipality. 
20
 The Herfindahl index was created by sector-municipality-year using level of employment. For a full discussion on 
measures of concentration see Hay and Morris (1987). 
21
 It is worth mentioning that in both matching and reweighting contexts we are left only with firms whose outcome 
was observed in both pre-treatment years i.e. 2002-2003. 
22
 We use the Stata package called ebalance introduced by Hainmueller and Xu (2011). In order to create the 
weights we apply the entropy balancing to the year 2003 by type of beneficiary for each outcome separately using 
the value of the outcome in 2002 and 2003 and all the observed characteristics of the firm (region, industry, size, age 
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balancing the first moment (mean) of the covariates and pre-treatment values of the outcome. 
Both the matching and reweighting methods allow us to eliminate a potential source of bias 
because non-beneficiaries are now more similar to beneficiaries.
23
  
In general, it takes time for the effects of cluster policy to manifest themselves in firm economic 
performance. The realization of the impact may require a period of gestation after the policy 
takes place. As a result, a proper consideration of the timing of the effects is crucial in an impact 
evaluation of a cluster program, and failures to account for this issue may lead to misleading 
conclusions and policy recommendations. To this end, we estimate the dynamic effects of the 
APL policy for the full, matched and reweighted sample. In terms of the previous notation: 
 
                                                        (2) 
where       takes value one if the firm received the program k years ago and 0 otherwise. 
(d) Robustness Checks 
To further address the validity of the control group and therefore the robustness of our results we 
run a pre-treatment trends equality test which assesses whether the pre-intervention time trends 
for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are different.
24
 We use only the observations of 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in the pre-treatment period i.e. 2002-2003 and run the 
following regression: 
 
                                         (3) 
where            is the interaction between the treatment status      and the respective pre-




IV. THE DATA 
Using the Cadastro Nacional Pessoa Juridica (CNPJ)
26
 from firms participating in APLs and 
registered in SEBRAE, it was possible to match the information from the Relacao Anual de 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and a Herfindahl index) for the direct impact while only these values of the outcome for the indirect impact in order 
the algorithm to converge. 
23
 Heckman et al. (1997) and Heckman et al. (1998) point out this source of bias. 
24
 See Galiani et al. (2005). 
25
 See Heckman and Hotz (1989). 
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 and Secretaria de Comércio Exterior (SECEX) of Brazil. Using 
the database of firms registered at SEBRAE, the spatial distribution of firms in Minas Gerais and 
Sao Paulo for which data are available is pictured in Figures 1 and 2. 
Table 1 displays the composition of our sample over time. We do not consider firms with 
observations only before or only after their starting year of treatment (direct or indirect) in order 
not to contaminate our control and treated group respectively. After excluding large firms, firms 
with only one observation and sectors with too few firms participating in APLs, we are left with 
a sample of 580,083 observations from 110,601 SMEs for the period 2002-2009.
28
 Table 2 
presents the distribution of firms by starting year in APLs or treated municipality. The bulk of 
the cluster project started in 2004, and the number of firms participating in APLs before that year 
is negligible. Moreover, Table 3 and 4 show that the APL policy targeted firms mainly from the 
Leather industry and small firms.  
The outcomes of interest are level of employment, the log of exports and a dummy (dexport) that 
takes the value 1 if the firm exports and value 0 otherwise.
29
 Additional control variables include 
the log of firm’s age and a Herfindahl index, which is a measure of concentration. 
Table 5 and Figures 3-5 depict the evolution of the outcomes over time, which allows us to 
perform a preliminary analysis by comparing the performances of our three groups of interest. A 
salient feature highlighted by the figures is that, in all years under study, the treated group has 
better outcomes than the other two, and the indirect beneficiaries also perform better than the 
control group. For instance, in 2002, firms that will participate in the program later have on 
average 16 more workers than the indirect beneficiaries, which in turn have on average two more 
workers than the comparison group. A similar phenomenon is observed for the probability of 
exporting; in this case, in 2002 the cluster firms were three percentage points more likely to 
export than the indirect beneficiaries and five percentage points more likely than the control 
firms. This provides evidence of a selection bias where firms that participate in the program 
show a better performance even before treatment than the firms that do not participate, and thus 
would be expected to have higher outcomes in absence of the program. 
                                                          
27
 The RAIS is an annual survey including socio-economic information of firms in Brazil. It is an administrative 
record of the labor force profile which is mandatory in Brazil for all firms in all sectors. 
28
 The following sectors: agriculture, livestock and related products, extraction of metallic minerals, motor vehicles, 
accommodation and food, ground transportation, financial intermediation, computers, public administration, defense 
and social security, education and associative activities presented only one observation in the 2007 RAIS and were 
excluded from the tables because of confidentiality issues. We also eliminate paper products, metal products, 
medical instruments and chemical products industries because they have a negligible number of APL firms. 
29
  We replicate estimates using the log of employment as dependent variable and we find similar results to those 
presented in the paper in terms of the magnitude, sign and significance of the impact of the program on level of 
employment. For the sake of brevity we only present the results for level of employment for which the interpretation 
is more straightforward. For the outcome log of exports we assign the value of 0 when firms have 0 exports to avoid 
excluding non-exporting firms from our sample, which could bias the results by affecting the composition of the 
treatment and control groups (see Angrist and Pischke, 2008). 
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By looking at the changes in outcomes over time, we can find some evidence in favor of positive 
direct effects of the cluster policy. Employment of treated firms not only starts from a higher 
level but also increases more rapidly than for untreated firms, which after a slight decrease, 
nearly returns to its initial level from 2002. Indirect beneficiaries and control firms appear to 
move in tandem, which would suggest, at most, very modest indirect effects. As to the logarithm 
of exports, we also observe a much higher level for treated firms. The outcome for participating 
firms reveals a sharp increase around 2004 which stabilizes in an intermediate level after 2006, 
while non-participating firms show an almost constant level over the period under study, or, if 
anything, a slight rise or drop for indirect and non-beneficiaries respectively . Figure 5 suggests 
that most of the change in exports is driven by the probability of becoming an exporter. 
Importantly, these figures point to a time-varying impact of the cluster policy on export behavior 
of firms. 
Some back-of-the-envelope calculations may give us a sense of the magnitudes of these effects. 
We can collapse the data in table 5 by averaging the periods before (2002-2003) and after (2004-
2009) the treatment and compare the before-after changes for each group (see Tables 6-7). This 
simple diff-in-diff estimator yields positive direct effects on the three outcomes: we find an 
impact on employment of around 13 workers, a 64% increase in exports with a 5 percentage 
point increase in the probability of exporting. As to the indirect effects, these simple estimates 
are much more modest: a positive but small indirect effect of around 3 workers, a 11% increase 
in total exports and one percentage point increase in the probability of exporting. 
In sum, our preliminary analysis points to positive direct effects with, at most, very modest 
indirect effects on our three outcomes. However, these naïve diff-in-diff estimators may be 
seriously affected by several types of biases. First, the figures reveal that the three groups present 
very different behaviors in the pre-treatment period; for instance, the log of exports show a sharp 
increase for treated firms between 2002 and 2003, while non-participating firms barely move. 
This dissimilarity between pre-treatment trends casts doubts on the validity of the diff-in-diff 
method, and is in fact a pervasive problem in the literature first described by Ashenfelter (1978). 
Furthermore, the figures suggest that by calculating an average effect over the whole period we 
may be masking some very complex dynamics and wasting relevant information on the 
interaction between the program and firm performance over time. With these initial estimates in 
mind, in the next section we will use the econometric methodology explained previously to 
account for these and other potential concerns such as differential trends by industry, and to 






V. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Employment 
Using the full sample, our first set of results (Tables 8-9, Part A) show a positive and significant 
direct impact and a negative and significant indirect impact of the cluster program on 
employment;
30
 more precisely, the program increases the employment level by around ten 
workers for direct beneficiaries. However, the negative effect on indirect beneficiaries is almost 
negligible: less than one worker. This is in line with the descriptive statistics presented in Table 
5, which show that employment in APL firms grows on average faster than in non-beneficiaries 
while remains practically invariant in indirect beneficiaries.  
A typical interpretation of the positive direct impact on employment is that agglomeration 
economies on the labor markets as well as knowledge and input’s markets are direct externalities 
and are generally assumed to improve total factor productivity (TFP) and firm-level 
performance, and encourage the opening of new plants, the growing of existing plants or the 
attraction of other plants in the region.
31
 APL policy through labor market externalities may 
foster the creation of pools of specialized workers allowing APL firms to demand more workers 
for different jobs but around the same activity and to propose specific trainings that could 
improve workers’ efficiency. Moreover, knowing that they do not face ex post appropriation and 
that it is easier to recoup the cost of acquiring industry-specific human capital, workers join the 
cluster and invest in human capital (Rotemberg and Saloner, 2000). As Marshall stressed, 
workers learn skills quickly from each other in an industrial cluster. In this context, if APL 
workers have the risk of losing their jobs when there are shocks, they might be relocated more 
easily in other company inside the cluster moving to more productive firms.
32
 On the other 
hands, workers in indirect beneficiaries may see the cluster as a more promising job alternative, 
with higher possibilities of professional growth. Then, the cluster might also absorb workers 
from firms outside but close to it. Indeed, the strong direct effect of the cluster policy on 
employment could be in part reflected by a slight relocation of workers from indirect 
beneficiaries to direct beneficiaries. 
These estimates are robust to the inclusion of additional controls – log of firm’s age and 
Herfindahl index – and industry-year interactions that allow different sectors to have different 
trends over time. Moreover, if we consider the dynamic effects (see Table 10, Part A) the direct 
effect appears to be increasing over time, starting from a magnitude of around six workers in the 
first year after treatment and up to around seventeen workers after six years of treatment. 
                                                          
30
 It is worth mentioning that the fixed-effects method allows us to control for firm, municipality, state and industry 
non-observables that do not vary over time. 
31
 See Rosenthal and Strange (2001) and Ellison et al. (2010). Li et al. (2012) find that industrial agglomeration has 
a positive and statistically significant causal impact on firm size for the case of manufacturing firms in China. 
32
 Our results reinforce the idea that the benefits of labor pooling might prevail against the costs of labor poaching. 
This trade-off is addressed in Combes and Duranton (2006). 
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As mentioned above, a potential concern with this first set of results is that our database 
combines data from very heterogeneous firms, which could undermine the validity of our 
identification strategy. To account for this factor, we also run the previous regressions on a 
matched sample and on a reweighted sample as previously explained. The results are presented 
in Part B and C of Tables 8-9. Not only the magnitude of the estimated coefficients is similar, but 
also their statistical significance is maintained. These estimates are also robust to the inclusion of 
controls and industry-year interactions. Moreover, in Appendix I we show how the reweighting 
scheme allows making more similar the kernel density of the propensity score – estimated from a 
logit of the treatment variable on covariates – (Figure A) and balancing the covariates means 
(Figure B) between the direct beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries for the case of employment. 
Finally, in Table 11 we assessed the validity of the “Equal trends assumption” comparing 
changes in employment for the treatment and comparison groups before the program is 
implemented. While the estimates of the direct impact based on the full sample clearly do not 
pass the pre-treatment trends equality test, after matching or reweighting trends in employment 
in the pre-treatment period are more similar (see Figures 6-7). This test supports the assumption 
that mean employment of the treatment and control groups would have continued to move in 
tandem in the post-intervention period in absence of the cluster program.  
Exports and likelihood of exporting 
Tables 12 and 13 show the results for the log of exports. We find large, positive and statistically 
significant average direct effects between 40% and 60% depending on the specification. If we 
correct the estimates to account for the fact that the treatment is a dummy variable, we get 
estimates ranging from around 50% to 80%.
33
 Moreover, the dynamics of these effects for the 
full sample are consistent with what we described graphically in the previous section. The impact 
on exports is large and significant, but decreasing over time. However, as mentioned before, the 
control group does not seem to be a good comparison, since it exhibits a very different pre-
treatment behavior than the treatment group. After correcting this issue, we get a different pattern 
of the effects. The reweighted sample reveals an increasing effect over time, although the 
increase in the impact is not monotonic. 
As to the spillovers, table 13 reveals some modest but significant positive average indirect 
effects, which range from around 2% to 4%. According to table 14, these impacts seem to 
become relevant only after the second year, which is reasonable since spillover effects are 
expected to take time to materialize.
34
 The estimates show a positive trend, reaching the value of 
around 10% in the sixth year. 
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 The correction is b*=(exp(b)-1)*100. 
34
 See Jaffe et al. (1993). 
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Table 15 tests whether trends were similar before treatment. As suspected from the 
aforementioned figures, trends of APL firms and non-beneficiaries are statistically different for 
the full sample. Although our matching procedure reduces this difference, it does not manage to 
make it disappear. The reweighting procedure, on the other hand, successfully equalizes the 
trends, which suggests that the results based on this method would be the preferred ones (see 
Figure 8). With respect to indirect effects, we find no evidence of differential ex-ante trends (see 
Figure 9). 
In sum, even if our data does not allow us to draw precise conclusions on the exact magnitude of 
the effects, all our results point to large but time-varying direct impacts and modest but time-
increasing indirect effects on exports. 
Two different factors could be driving these results. While the most straightforward one is that 
exporting firms could increase their level of exports because of the program, the cluster policy 
could also be an incentive for non-exporting firms to start exporting their products. In fact, our 
visual analysis in the previous section suggested that a higher proportion of exporting firms 
could be an important determinant of the change in average exports. To further explore this 
possibility, we analyze the effect of the program on the probability of exporting. The results can 
be seen in tables 16 and 17. Indeed, we find strongly significant increases in the likelihood of 
exporting of about 4 to 5 percentage points for direct beneficiaries. The ex-ante trends, which are 
different for both the full and matched samples, are equalized by reweighting procedure (see 
Table 19 and Figure 10). In this case, the effects are increasing over time, getting as high as 
seven percentage points (Table 18). As to indirect effects, the probability of exporting is 
increased for indirect beneficiaries by around one percent point, which is significant from a 
statistical point of view but modest from an economic perspective. Again, these effects become 
significant after the second year of the program and there is no evidence of differential ex-ante 
trends (Figure 11). 
Thus, we find that the increase in exports is driven not only by the change in the level of exports 
but also by a higher proportion of exporting firms. These results are in line with the idea that 
APL firms are expected to have more advantages to compete in international markets and more 
likely to engage in export activities than non-beneficiaries that operate in isolated areas due to 
knowledge, skills, new technology and network creation through clustering. As mentioned 
before, these externalities may improve productivity and it has been pointed out in the literature 
(see Bernard et al., 2003, and Bernard and Jensen, 2004) that high productivity leads a firm to 
export. Even thought the results suggest that firms located outside the cluster but in the same 
municipality may also benefit from the cluster and its agglomeration externalities, they need 





VI. FINAL REMARKS 
In this paper, we present what is to our knowledge the first evaluation of the direct and spillover 
effects of a specific cluster policy in Latin America. Our first set of results on the Brazilian APL 
policy is positive and has interesting policy implications. 
First, we show that firm-level performance benefits from the cluster policy. We find positive 
direct average effects of the program on employment, level of exports and likelihood of 
exporting with an increasing pattern over time. These findings compare favorably with the 
results obtained for the industrial clusters in France (Martin et al., 2011a) where the policy had 
no robust effect on employment or exports, and are in line with the intuition that small firms 
benefit more and generate more agglomeration economies as pointed out by Henderson (2003), 
Rosenthal and Strange (2003, 2010) and Martin et al. (2011b). Second, we also find the presence 
of positive spillovers through geographical proximity on both export outcomes which gain 
relevance in the medium and long-term. Third, our dynamic analysis reinforces the importance 
of correctly accounting for the timing and considering gestation periods when assessing the 
impact of clusters policies to allow both the direct and indirect effects of such policies to 
materialize.  
This study is only the first step towards a better understanding of the impacts of cluster policies 
in developing countries. Further research is required to rationalize the impacts of clusters policies 
and to explore its mechanisms in depth. Many of the limitations of our study are related to data 
availability, and a lot of interesting insights on these issues could be obtained from a richer set of 
data. A more comprehensive approach would benefit from controlling for other characteristics of 
the firms, industries and regions.  
In the same direction, future extensions of this study could focus on the heterogeneity of impact 
for different types of firms and industries, and also how different kind of industries can interact 
to generate different types of externalities. Moreover, there are several mechanisms that create 
spillovers and therefore indirect beneficiaries. For example, indirect beneficiaries could also be 
defined as non-treated firms that hired workers that were working in a treated firm i.e. labor 
mobility is the channel for spillovers.
35
 Worker-level data would allow identifying indirect 
effects through this channel and for instance, to determine whether workers are moving inside 
the cluster from outside. Finally, it would be interesting to extend the analysis of spillover effects 
using geospatial data on firm location, which can help not only to use more precise definitions of 
clustering but also to explore how indirect effects vary with distance to the cluster. Only a 
significantly expanded set of information will allow these research extensions.  
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Figure 1 – Spatial distribution of APLs in Minas Gerais 
 
                      Source: Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada 
Figure 2 – Spatial distribution of APLs in São Paulo 
 
                       Source: Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada 
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Table 1. Temporal composition of the sample 
            
   
Observations 
Year Observations % APL firms Indirect Beneficiaries Non-beneficiaries 
2002 61,665 10.63 455 29,937 31,273 
2003 71,354 12.30 499 34,643 36,212 
2004 74,425 12.83 508 35,014 38,903 
2005 75,468 13.01 515 33,061 41,892 
2006 73,433 12.66 494 29,912 43,027 
2007 75,133 12.95 505 28,853 45,775 
2008 76,967 13.27 511 28,060 48,396 
2009 71,638 12.35 496 26,614 44,528 
Total 580,083 100.00 3,983 246,094 330,006 
* The first column (APL firms) displays the observed number of firms in each year that will be eventually treated between 2004 
and 2009. The second column displays the observed number of firms in each year that will become indirect beneficiaries 
between 2004 and 2009. The third column represents the observed number of firms in each year that are non-beneficiaries for 
the whole period. 
 
Table 2. Number of firms by starting year in APLs or treated municipality 
      
Starting year  APL firms IB 
2004 396 29,621 
2005 66 3,827 
2006 14 387 
2007 3 430 
2008 9 97 
2009 60 6,206 
Total 548 40,568 
* “IB” is indirect beneficiaries. 
 
 
Table 3. Number of firms by industry                 
          
Industry APL firms IB NB Total 
Clothing 25 4,053 5,207 9,285 
Leather 285 1,562 956 2,803 
Non-metallic minerals 48 256 1,524 1,828 
Machinery & Equipment 19 4,028 5,364 9,411 
Electronics & Computer equipment 21 398 285 704 
Furniture 130 1,678 2,968 4,776 
Retail & Wholesale 20 28,593 53,181 81,794 
Total 548 40,568 69,485 110,601 
                       * “IB” is indirect beneficiaries and “NB” is non-beneficiaries. 
25 
 
Table 4. Number of firms by size                    
          
Firm Size APL firms IB NB Total 
Small 517 39,764 68,655 108,936 
Medium 31 804 830 1,665 
Total 548 40,568 69,485 110,601 
                                     * “IB” is indirect beneficiaries and “NB” is non-beneficiaries. 
 
Table 5. Evolution of average outcomes 
 
                  
  Direct Beneficiaries Indirect Beneficiaries Non-Beneficiaries 
Year / Outcome Em Le De Em Le De Em Le De 
2002 36.618 0.772 0.075 20.043 0.477 0.045 18.348 0.268 0.024 
2003 38.268 1.572 0.146 19.379 0.451 0.041 17.837 0.265 0.023 
2004 43.115 1.995 0.181 20.393 0.485 0.044 17.829 0.268 0.023 
2005 46.375 1.966 0.175 21.632 0.473 0.042 17.968 0.232 0.020 
2006 48.714 1.732 0.154 22.520 0.534 0.050 17.609 0.222 0.020 
2007 52.429 1.620 0.143 23.548 0.554 0.052 17.969 0.213 0.019 
2008 55.057 1.645 0.145 24.629 0.557 0.052 18.344 0.196 0.017 
2009 54.421 1.670 0.147 24.677 0.557 0.052 19.074 0.202 0.018 
* “Em” is employment, “Le” is log of exports and “De” is dexport. 
 
Table 6. Before-After comparisons 
 
                  
 
Direct Beneficiaries Indirect Beneficiaries Non-Beneficiaries 
  Em Le De Em Le De Em Le De 
Before 37.443 1.172 0.111 19.711 0.464 0.043 18.092 0.267 0.024 
After 50.018 1.771 0.157 22.900 0.527 0.049 18.132 0.222 0.019 
Difference 12.575 0.599 0.047 3.189 0.063 0.006 0.040 -0.045 -0.004 
* “Em” is employment, “Le” is log of exports and “De” is dexport. 
 
 
Table 7. Naïve diff-in-diff estimates 
 
      
  Employment Log(exports) Pr(export) 
Direct 12.54 0.64 0.05 
Indirect 3.15 0.11 0.01 






Figure 3. Evolution of average employment 
 
Figure 4. Evolution of average log of exports
 
 
































Impact on Employment 
 
Direct impact on employment 
 
 
Figure 6.  Mean employment for each group over time (DB vs. NB) 





Table 8 - Direct effect on employment 
  A - Full sample B - Matched sample C - Reweighted sample 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
C 9.6953*** 9.6123*** 9.4563*** 7.3737*** 6.7961*** 6.2989*** 9.2933*** 8.4325*** 8.9041*** 
 
(1.545) (1.540) (1.578) (1.806) (1.801) (2.057) (1.926) (1.782) (1.899) 
Constant 15.1206*** -14.8586*** -14.9929*** 35.9960*** 8.6899 8.1755 37.0556*** 1.6381 -4.3763 
 
(0.099) (1.531) (1.525) (1.152) (28.827) (31.368) (0.976) (27.409) (29.318) 
          
Observations 333,989 333,989 333,989 5,001 5,001 5,001 186,586 186,586 186,586 
R-squared 0.034 0.045 0.050 0.052 0.057 0.091 0.044 0.056 0.078 
Number of firms 70,033 70,033 70,033 694 694 694 29,951 29,951 29,951 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Industry trends No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Reweighting scheme No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
a) Fixed-effects estimates reported with Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  


















































































































Indirect impact on employment  
 
Figure 7. Mean employment for each group over time (IB vs. NB) 




Table 9 - Indirect effect on employment 
  A - Full sample B - Matched sample C - Reweighted sample 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
C -0.3227*** -0.5050*** -0.5086*** -0.8934*** -1.0757*** -0.9645*** -0.6911*** -0.8490*** -0.8179*** 
 
(0.110) (0.110) (0.109) (0.169) (0.171) (0.169) (0.144) (0.146) (0.146) 
Constant 16.7326*** -14.2319*** -15.0885*** 21.4787*** -6.6594** -8.7506*** 21.3203*** -3.5949 -5.3704** 
 
(0.067) (1.226) (1.224) (0.078) (2.838) (2.840) (0.068) (2.329) (2.327) 
          
Observations 576,100 576,100 576,100 255,026 255,026 255,026 372,552 372,552 372,552 
R-squared 0.030 0.039 0.044 0.023 0.027 0.032 0.024 0.027 0.032 
Number of firms 110,053 110,053 110,053 38,659 38,659 38,659 57,702 57,702 57,702 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Industry trends No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Reweighting scheme No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
a) Fixed-effects estimates reported with Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  

































































































Table 10. Dynamics effects on employment 
     
    
  A- Full sample B - Matched sample C- Reweighted sample 
  Direct Indirect Direct  Indirect Direct  Indirect 
C1 5.6711*** -0.1593* 3.4767** -0.5364*** 6.1735*** -0.4961*** 
 
(0.886) (0.088) (1.581) (0.130) (1.361) (0.111) 
C2 7.4725*** -0.7357*** 5.2488** -1.1537*** 7.8666*** -0.9645*** 
 
(1.362) (0.124) (2.218) (0.193) (1.831) (0.157) 
C3 8.8454*** -0.8715*** 6.8189** -1.3250*** 8.4316*** -1.0536*** 
 
(1.864) (0.156) (2.674) (0.245) (2.220) (0.199) 
C4 11.3108*** -0.9400*** 8.9975*** -1.5260*** 10.3994*** -1.2131*** 
 
(2.378) (0.177) (3.122) (0.282) (2.864) (0.226) 
C5 14.1919*** -0.5926*** 12.3965*** -1.1975*** 13.2967*** -0.9294*** 
 
(2.924) (0.203) (3.902) (0.327) (3.616) (0.263) 
C6 16.7360*** -0.2154 15.2751*** -0.9164** 17.3583*** -0.5601* 
 
(3.530) (0.231) (4.663) (0.382) (4.479) (0.300) 





Constant -15.2314*** -15.3454*** 10.2686 -8.8231*** -2.3577 -5.3750** 
 
(1.519) (1.247) (31.516) (2.842) (29.287) (2.328) 
Observations 333,989 576,100 5,001 255,026 186,586 372,552 
R-squared 0.051 0.044 0.096 0.032 0.083 0.033 
Number of firms 70,033 110,053 694 38,659 29,951 57,702 
a) Fixed-effects estimates with controls and industry trends. 
 b) Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 c) “Ck” indicates if the firm received the program k years ago. 
 
Table 11. Pre-treatment trends equality test on employment 
     
    
  A- Full sample B - Matched sample C- Reweighted sample 
  Direct Indirect Direct  Indirect Direct  Indirect 
Cs_2003 4.3367*** 0.0724 0.7947 -0.0901 -0.1244 -0.0065 
 
(0.684) (0.078) (1.538) (0.117) (1.324) (0.091) 





Constant -35.8139*** -40.0245*** -22.6056 -46.6899*** -2.2046 -40.2645*** 
 
(3.406) (2.371) (41.683) (3.097) (26.882) (2.673) 
Observations 68,439 132,065 1,388 77,318 59,902 115,404 
R-squared 0.025 0.027 0.079 0.030 0.083 0.025 
Number of firms 38,488 74,363 694 38,659 29,951 57,702 
a) Fixed-effects estimates with controls and industry trends. 
b) Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 





Impact on level of exports 
Direct impact on log of exports  
Figure 8.  Mean log of exports for each group over time (DB vs. NB) 




          
 
Table 12 - Direct effect on log of exports 
  A - Full sample B - Matched sample C - Reweighted sample 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
C 0.5790*** 0.5787*** 0.5104*** 0.4781*** 0.4543*** 0.3983*** 0.6485*** 0.6180*** 0.5935*** 
 
(0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.141) (0.141) (0.141) (0.160) (0.156) (0.154) 
Constant 0.1858*** 0.0444 0.0468 0.6203*** 3.3350* 3.4565** 0.8109*** 0.3169 0.1221 
 
(0.006) (0.060) (0.060) (0.103) (1.707) (1.741) (0.107) (2.297) (2.166) 
          
Observations 333,989 333,989 333,989 4,955 4,955 4,955 186,586 186,586 186,586 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.035 0.038 0.067 0.042 0.044 0.066 
Number of firms 70,033 70,033 70,033 697 697 697 29,951 29,951 29,951 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Industry trends No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Reweighting scheme No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
a) Fixed-effects estimates reported with Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  

















































































Indirect impact on log of exports 
Figure 9. Mean log of exports for each group over time (IB vs. NB) 




Table 13 - Indirect effect on log of exports 
  A - Full sample B - Matched sample C - Reweighted sample 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
C 0.0234*** 0.0226*** 0.0215*** 0.0158 0.0136 0.0246* 0.0437*** 0.0424*** 0.0446*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Constant 0.2843*** 0.1983*** 0.1577** 0.5079*** 0.4160** 0.3178* 0.4923*** 0.3837*** 0.2895** 
 
(0.005) (0.062) (0.061) (0.007) (0.185) (0.184) (0.006) (0.143) (0.143) 
          
Observations 576,100 576,100 576,100 237,224 237,224 237,224 372,552 372,552 372,552 
R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.004 
Number of firms 110,053 110,053 110,053 35,834 35,834 35,834 57,702 57,702 57,702 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Industry trends No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Reweighting scheme No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
a) Fixed-effects estimates reported with Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  













































































Table 14. Dynamics effects on log of exports   
     
    
  A- Full sample B - Matched sample C- Reweighted sample 
  Direct Indirect Direct  Indirect Direct  Indirect 
C1 0.6238*** -0.0003 0.5149*** 0.0040 0.4805*** 0.0096 
 
(0.113) (0.007) (0.140) (0.012) (0.160) (0.010) 
C2 0.6385*** -0.0123 0.4440** -0.0044 0.5810*** 0.0085 
 
(0.145) (0.010) (0.192) (0.017) (0.217) (0.014) 
C3 0.4004*** 0.0472*** 0.2382 0.0475** 0.5064** 0.0697*** 
 
(0.152) (0.012) (0.218) (0.020) (0.219) (0.016) 
C4 0.4097*** 0.0615*** 0.3091 0.0814*** 0.8180*** 0.0959*** 
 
(0.157) (0.013) (0.197) (0.022) (0.242) (0.017) 
C5 0.3882** 0.0705*** 0.2694 0.0957*** 0.6946*** 0.1012*** 
 
(0.159) (0.014) (0.205) (0.024) (0.235) (0.018) 
C6 0.4156** 0.0778*** 0.3454 0.1051*** 0.7561*** 0.1074*** 
 
(0.171) (0.015) (0.236) (0.027) (0.261) (0.019) 





Constant 0.0514 0.1102* 3.4168* 0.3386* 0.1750 0.2833** 
 
(0.060) (0.062) (1.742) (0.185) (2.143) (0.143) 
Observations 333,989 576,100 4,955 237,224 186,586 372,552 
R-squared 0.009 0.005 0.068 0.006 0.067 0.005 
Number of firms 70,033 110,053 697 35,834 29,951 57,702 
a) Fixed-effects estimates with controls and industry trends. 
 b) Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
c) “Ck” indicates if the firm received the program k years ago. 
 
 
Table 15. Pre-treatment trends equality test on log of exports       
     
    
  A- Full sample B - Matched sample C- Reweighted sample 
  Direct Indirect Direct  Indirect Direct  Indirect 
Cs_2003 0.7865*** -0.0039 0.4841** 0.0155 -0.0018 -0.0055 
 
(0.152) (0.011) (0.207) (0.018) (0.280) (0.012) 





Constant 0.0668 -0.0271 12.8835** 0.0333 3.9742 -0.0112 
 
(0.292) (0.238) (5.793) (0.367) (9.294) (0.273) 
Observations 68,439 132,065 1,394 71,668 59,902 115,404 
R-squared 0.015 0.001 0.100 0.001 0.103 0.001 
Number of firms 38,488 74,363 697 35,834 29,951 57,702 
a) Fixed-effects estimates with controls and industry trends. 
b) Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 





Impact on the likelihood of exporting 
Direct impact on dexport 
 
Figure 10. Mean dexport for each group over time (DB vs. NB) 
 






Table 16 - Direct effect on the likelihood of exporting 
  A - Full sample B - Matched sample C - Reweighted sample 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
C 0.0454*** 0.0454*** 0.0388*** 0.0490*** 0.0491*** 0.0414*** 0.0581*** 0.0559*** 0.0536*** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
Constant 0.0171*** -0.0012 -0.0004 0.0731*** 0.3194* 0.2984* 0.0792*** 0.0275 0.0100 
 
(0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.165) (0.172) (0.009) (0.178) (0.176) 
          
Observations 333,989 333,989 333,989 4,994 4,994 4,994 186,586 186,586 186,586 
R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.027 0.030 0.049 0.036 0.037 0.053 
Number of firms 70,033 70,033 70,033 690 690 690 29,951 29,951 29,951 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Industry trends No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Reweighting scheme No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
a) Fixed-effects estimates reported with Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
























































































Indirect impact on dexport  
Figure 11. Mean dexport for each group over time (IB vs. NB) 




Table 17 - Indirect effect on the likelihood of exporting 
  A - Full sample B - Matched sample C - Reweighted sample 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
C 0.0026*** 0.0025*** 0.0023*** 0.0032** 0.0031** 0.0037*** 0.0062*** 0.0062*** 0.0061*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.0264*** 0.0133** 0.0106* 0.0473*** 0.0269 0.0220 0.0464*** 0.0195 0.0155 
 
(0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.018) (0.018) (0.001) (0.014) (0.014) 
          
Observations 576,100 576,100 576,100 237,582 237,582 237,582 372,552 372,552 372,552 
R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.003 
Number of firms 110,053 110,053 110,053 35,888 35,888 35,888 57,702 57,702 57,702 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Industry trends No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Reweighting scheme No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
a) Fixed-effects estimates reported with Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  









































































































Table 18. Dynamics effects on likelihood of exporting 
     
    
  A- Full sample B - Matched sample C- Reweighted sample 
  Direct Indirect Direct  Indirect Direct  Indirect 
C1 0.0516*** -0.0001 0.0443*** 0.0011 0.0446*** 0.0021* 
 
(0.011) (0.001) (0.013) (0.001) (0.015) (0.001) 
C2 0.0516*** -0.0017* 0.0450** 0.0005 0.0559*** 0.0019 
 
(0.014) (0.001) (0.018) (0.002) (0.021) (0.001) 
C3 0.0280** 0.0057*** 0.0352* 0.0074*** 0.0470** 0.0094*** 
 
(0.014) (0.001) (0.021) (0.002) (0.021) (0.002) 
C4 0.0272* 0.0068*** 0.0413** 0.0099*** 0.0675*** 0.0119*** 
 
(0.014) (0.001) (0.020) (0.002) (0.021) (0.002) 
C5 0.0255* 0.0077*** 0.0345* 0.0110*** 0.0605*** 0.0125*** 
 
(0.015) (0.001) (0.020) (0.002) (0.021) (0.002) 
C6 0.0286* 0.0086*** 0.0461* 0.0124*** 0.0669*** 0.0135*** 
 
(0.016) (0.001) (0.024) (0.003) (0.023) (0.002) 





Constant 0.0001 0.0054 0.2975* 0.0241 0.0134 0.0148 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.172) (0.018) (0.174) (0.014) 
Observations 333,989 576,100 4,994 237,582 186,586 372,552 
R-squared 0.006 0.004 0.049 0.005 0.053 0.004 
Number of firms 70,033 110,053 690 35,888 29,951 57,702 
a) Fixed-effects estimates with controls and industry trends 
 b) Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
c) “Ck” indicates if the firm received the program k years ago. 
 
 
Table 19. Pre-treatment trends equality test on likelihood of exporting 
     
    
  A- Full sample B - Matched sample C- Reweighted sample 
  Direct Indirect Direct  Indirect Direct  Indirect 
Cs_2003 0.0709*** -0.0007 0.0374* 0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0005 
 
(0.015) (0.001) (0.020) (0.002) (0.025) (0.001) 





Constant 0.0039 -0.0111 1.1862** -0.0119 0.6272 -0.0114 
 
(0.029) (0.024) (0.586) (0.037) (0.701) (0.028) 
Observations 68,439 132,065 1,380 71,776 59,902 115,404 
R-squared 0.012 0.001 0.090 0.001 0.090 0.001 
Number of firms 38,488 74,363 690 35,888 29,951 57,702 
a) Fixed-effects estimates with controls and industry trends. 
b) Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 




Appendix I. Example of outputs of the reweighting scheme. Direct impact on employment  
 
Figure A. Kernel density of propensity score before and after reweighting 
 
 

























































Standardized Difference btw. Treated and Control Group
before reweighting after reweighting
